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A simulation model incorporating stochastic yields, prices, and government payments generates 
returns for landowners and tenants under cash, share, and flexible leases. Corn, soybeans, wheat, 
cotton, peanuts, and wheat-double crop soybeans crop enterprises are studied.  Alternatives are 
evaluated by mean returns, coefficient of variation, and certainty equivalent analysis. 
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An Evaluation of Alternative Cash, Share, and Flexible Leasing Arrangements for South Carolina 
Grain Farms 
 
Farm business managers are continuously looking for opportunities to spread their fixed 
costs over additional acreage.  Leasing land may be the preferred method of expanding the farm 
business, as the large investment associated with purchasing land can be avoided.  As tenants bid to 
rent additional land, competition may cause tenants to bid at rates that exceed the economic return 
to land.   
  Tenants face the problem of determining an economical rental bid given the uncertainty of 
yields and prices.  Yield risk has been evident in South Carolina from 1998-2002, as the state 
experienced severe drought conditions each year.  Commodity prices have also been below their 
ten-year average each year of the drought.  Despite below average yields and prices, cash rental 
rates have increased due, in part, to government program payments.  The 2002 Farm bill establishes 
a three-tiered system of payments to reduce revenue risk (USDA Farm Bill).  The direct payment 
rates are known with certainty while the counter-cyclical payments and loan deficiency payments 
are uncertain.  The direct and counter-cyclical program payments are made to the producers, with 
landowners eligible to receive payments only if they share in the business risk. Landowners have an 
incentive to increase cash rental rates to capture the direct and potential counter-cyclical payments.  
Similarly, tenants may increase their rental bid based on their expectation of counter-cyclical 
payments and loan deficiency payments that may not occur. 
Both landowners and tenants are making decisions under uncertainty.  Tenants have the 
challenge of determining the economic return to land when prices, yields, and government program 
payments are uncertain.  Landowners face similar uncertainty in determining a rental rate that 
generates the largest return that the rental market will bear.  Given the competition in the rental 







actual prices or yields may provide income stability to the landowner as well as helping tenants 
reduce the risk from over-bidding for rented land. 
Literature 
  Langemeier, Albright, and Delano discuss the advantages and disadvantages of alternative 
farmland leases.  An advantage of a crop-share lease is that price and yield risk, as well as input 
costs, are shared with the landowner.  Another potential advantage of a share lease is that the 
landowner is involved in making management decisions.  This could be beneficial for a producer 
that does not have extensive management experience, like a beginning farmer.  Of course, joint 
management decisions may create conflict between the tenant and landowner if they do not agree on 
management practices.  Another disadvantage is that detailed records must be kept to ensure 
accurate division of costs and production.  While downside risk is limited in a share lease, the cash 
equivalent of a share lease may be significantly greater than the cash rental rate during years of 
above average yields or prices (Langemeier, Albright, and Delano).   
  An advantage of cash leases is that the lease is easy to implement.  Detailed record-keeping 
is not needed to accurately divide expenses and production, as the tenant pays all of the expense and 
receives all of the production.  The landowner does not share the price or yield risk and does not 
have the responsibility of marketing their share of the crop.  Since the landowner does not have 
input into management decisions, the potential for landowner/tenant conflict is reduced.  A 
disadvantage of a cash lease is that the tenant may not make improvements to the land, such as 
maintaining fertility levels.  Another disadvantage of a cash lease is that he tenant has all of the 







  An alternative to cash and share leases are flexible leases that adjust the cash rental rate by 
the actual harvest price or yield.  Under flexible leases, landowners share the price or yield risk but 
still have a guaranteed base rental rate (Edwards). 
  Muzinga, Lins, and Boehlje analyzed the returns to landowners and tenants for cash, share 
and flexible leases.  They found that flexible leases have greater risk and only slightly larger mean 
returns over a cash lease.  The conclusion is that landowners have little incentives to switch from a 
cash lease to a flexible lease (Muzinga, Lins, and Boehlje). 
  Held, in an analysis of cash, share, and flexible leases for an Indiana corn and soybean farm, 
found that tenants would prefer a share lease while landowners would prefer cash leases. While 
flexible leases reduced risk, purchasing crop insurance with cash leases provided greater risk 
reduction than the flexible leasing alternatives (Held). 
Methods 
  A stochastic simulation model is used to simulate the return to unpaid labor, management, 
and fixed machinery costs for corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, peanuts, and wheat-double crop 
soybeans in South Carolina.  The stochastic simulation model incorporated yield, price and 
government program payment risks in calculating the return for commodity i (equation 1). 
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The variables  i P
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 and  i Y
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 are the stochastic sales price and stochastic yield, respectively, for 
commodity i (equation 1).  The variables  i DP  and  i C
~
 in equation 1 represent the direct and 
counter-cyclical payments, respectively, for commodity i.  The direct payments are constant while 
the counter-cyclical payments are stochastic (equation 1).  The variable cost of producing 







cost of producing commodity i is held constant in the simulation model.  The variable  i R
~
 is the 
amount of rent paid for an acre of land to produce commodity i.   
The stochastic yield and price for commodity i are drawn from a multivariate empirical 
distribution based on the procedures outlined in Richardson, Klose, and Gray.  Equation 2 describes 
the stochastic yield for commodity i: 
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where  i Y
~
 is the stochastic yield for commodity i.  The deterministic yield, i Y , is the state-level 
average yield for commodity i from 1991-2002.  The stochastic component, 
i y ε ~ , is calculated as the 
percent deviation from the average yield from 1991-2002 for commodity i.  The yield is made 
stochastic by multiplying the deterministic yield component ( i Y ) by one plus the stochastically 
generated percent deviation from the average yield (
i y ε ~ ).  The percent error terms are coefficient of 
variation stationary, which means that the relative yield variability for commodity i is constant.  
However, as the deterministic yield component increases, the absolute yield variability increases. 
  The stochastic prices are also drawn from multivariate empirical distributions.  Equation 3 
through equation 6 describes how the cash price and loan deficiency payment for commodity i are 
determined.  The cash market price is based on the stochastic futures market price, described in 
equation 3. 
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 is the stochastic futures market price for commodity i at harvest.  The deterministic 
component, 
fut







The stochastic price component, 
i p ε ~ , is calculated as the percent deviation from the average futures 
market price from 1991-2002.   
  The cash price for commodity i is the stochastic futures market price plus the cash market 
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The cash market basis, 
cash
i B , is the average harvest time basis for commodity i from 1999-2002 
(Curtis).   
  The marketing loan program in the 2002 Farm Bill reduces price risk by providing loan 
deficiency payments whenever the posted-county price is below the commodity loan rate.  The 
stochastic posted-county price and stochastic loan deficiency payments are described in equation 5 
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The posted-county price basis for commodity i, 
pcp
i B , is the average harvest posted-county price 
basis for commodity i from 1999-2002 (Curtis).  The loan deficiency payment for commodity i,  i L
~
, 
is the larger of zero or the difference between the loan rate and the stochastic posted-county price 
(equation 6). 
It is important to recognize that the cash basis, 
cash
i B , is typically different than the posted-
county price basis, 
pcp
i B , for grains in the Southeast.  Posted-county prices are determined by the 
cash price at terminal Midwestern and Gulf port locations.  They are then adjusted to a particular 







grain supply and demand conditions might generate a substantial difference in the cash price paid 
locally for grain versus the posted-county price (Curtis). 
The price producers receive for corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, and wheat-double crop 
soybeans is the stochastic cash price plus the stochastic loan deficiency payment (equation 7).  
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  Peanuts, however, are assumed to be produced under a production contract that pays a 
premium of $25 per ton above the marketing loan rate.  The premium of $25 per ton was commonly 
offered to South Carolina peanut producers in 2003 (Smith).  The peanut sales price is constant in 
the stochastic simulation model due to the use of production contracts. 
  The stochastic simulation model also includes the revenue producers receive from 
government program payments.  The amount received from direct payments for commodity i is 
described in equation 8 (USDA Farm Bill). 
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where the base acres and program yield for commodity i are calculated on historical production 
from the 1980’s.  The direct payment rate is defined in the 2002 Farm Bill and is paid on 85% of 
historic production (equation 8).   
  In contrast, the counter-cyclical payments are stochastic as they depend on the U.S. 
marketing-year average price for commodity i.  The counter-cyclical payments are defined by 
equation 9 and 10. 









where the base acres and program yield are based on historical production from either the 1980’s or 
1998-2001 (USDA Farm Bill).  The counter-cyclical payment rate is stochastic and defined in 
equation 10. 
(10) CCP  Ratei = Max (0, Target Pricei –Direct Payment Ratei  
– Max (U.S. MYA Price, U.S. Loan Rate) 
The counter-cyclical payment is the target price for commodity i less the direct payment and the 
larger of the U.S. marketing-year average price or U.S. loan rate for commodity i (equation 10).  
The counter-cyclical payment is zero when the U.S. marketing-year average price plus the direct 
payment rate is greater than the target price.  The maximum counter-cyclical payment is made when 
the U.S. marketing-year average price is below the U.S. loan rate for commodity i. (USDA Farm 
Bill) 
Alternative Leasing Arrangements 
  This study evaluates five leasing alternatives.  One leasing alternative is to pay a fixed, cash 
rental rate for each acre of cropland.  The cash rental rate used in the simulation model is held 
constant at $28.50 per acre, which is the South Carolina state average rental rate for 2002 (South 
Carolina Agricultural Statistics).  
  An alternative to a cash lease is a share lease where production and input expense are shared 
by the tenant and landowner.  The direct and counter-cyclical payments are also shared by the 
proportion of the risk being shared with the landowner.  A 50%-50% share lease will be used in this 
study with the landowner sharing the crop seed, fertilizer, chemical, drying and storage expense.  
  Three flexible leasing arrangements are also simulated.  Equation 12 describes a lease that 
adjusts the rental rate by the relationship between the actual harvest price for commodity i 




















i R  is the cash rental rate for commodity i,  i P
~
 is the actual harvest-time cash price for 
commodity i from the simulation model, and 
p
i I  is the five-year average harvest-time price for 
commodity i.  The cash rent is increased for above-average prices and decreased for below average 
prices. 















i R  is the cash rental rate for commodity i,  i Y
~
 is the actual harvested yield for commodity 
i from the simulation model, and 
y
i I  is the five-year average harvested yield for commodity i.  The 
cash rent is increased for above-average yields and decreased for below average yields. 
  Equation 14 defines a lease that adjusts the rent based on the actual price and the actual yield 

















where the cash rent is adjusted for both price and yield variability. 
Certainty Equivalent Analysis 
  The leasing alternatives are ranked by their certainty equivalents to determine the effect of 
risk attitudes on the leasing alternatives preferred by the tenant and landowner.  The certainty 
equivalents are calculated for coefficients of relative risk aversion ranging from 0 (risk neutral) to 5 







expected utility and certainty equivalents because this function has constant relative risk aversion 
(Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson).   
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where r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and  j ρ  is the probability of having outcome j 
occurring.  The certainty equivalent is found by inverting equation 15, as described in equation 16. 
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Data 
  The summary statistics of the yield and price data used as inputs in the stochastic simulation 
model are reported in Table 1.  The yield data are South Carolina state average yields from 1991 – 
2002 (USDA NASS).  Cotton yields averaged 610 pounds per acre from 1991-2002, but the yield 
has ranged from 314 pounds to 846 pounds per acre (Table 1).  Similarly, corn yields have ranged 
from 40 bushels an acre to 108 bushels an acre over the same time period (Table 1).  Corn and 
cotton have larger coefficients of variation, 0.30 and 0.26, respectively, than the other commodities 
(Table 1).  Peanuts and soybeans have coefficients of variation of 0.16, which are the smallest 
coefficients of variation of all of the commodities (Table 1).  In other words, peanuts and soybeans 
have the smallest relative yield risk while corn has the largest relative yield risk. 
  Commodity futures prices have also varied greatly from 1991-2002.  December corn futures 
have ranged from $1.93 to $3.20 per bushel at harvest while December cotton futures have ranged 
from $0.31 to $0.85 per pound from 1991-2002 (Table 1).  Cotton and wheat futures have the 







  The stochastic counter-cyclical payments are based on U.S. marketing-year average prices 
described in Table 1.  Cotton prices have ranged from $0.30 to $0.75 per pound while soybean 
prices have ranged from $4.38 to $7.35 per bushel (Table 1). 
  The cash market and posted-county price basis data were collected on a daily basis from 
1999-2002.  The cash market basis used in the simulation are $0.00, -$0.40, $-0.30, and -$0.035 for 
corn, soybeans, wheat and cotton, respectively (Curtis).  Similarly, the posted-county price basis 
used in the simulations are -$0.17, -$0.31, -$0.43, and –$0.075 for corn, soybeans, wheat, and 
cotton, respectively (Curtis). 
The 2002 loan rates used in calculating the loan deficiency payments are for South Carolina 
covered commodities and are $2.18, $5.05, $2.45, $0.52, and $353.66, for corn, soybeans, wheat, 
cotton, and Virginia peanuts, respectively (USDA FSA).  The loan rate for Virginia type peanuts is 
used in the study because this type of peanut is being offered a premium of $25 per ton over the 
loan rate (Smith).  The direct and counter-cyclical payments are calculated using the rates defined in 
the 2002 Farm Bill for the 2004 production year (USDA Farm Bill).  
The variable costs of production are from Clemson University crop enterprise budgets for 
conventional tillage systems (Ferreira).  The variable costs used in the stochastic simulation model 
are $172, $90, $138, $382, $431, and $193 per acre for corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, peanuts, and 
wheat-double crop soybeans, respectively (Ferreira). 
Results 
  Tenants received the largest average return to unpaid labor, management and fixed 
machinery costs under cash leases for all crops simulated (Table 2 and Table 4).  Flexible leases do 
reduce revenue risk.  but at a trade-off of lower average returns (Table 2).  From the tenant’s 







soybeans, and wheat-double cropped soybeans while the yield adjusted lease has the smallest 
coefficient of variation for peanuts (Table 4).    
  In contrast, landowners received the largest average rent from a 50-50 crop share lease 
(Table 3 and Table 4).  Based on average returns, landowners would rank cash leases as the least 
preferred alternative (Table 5).  However, the constant return makes the cash lease preferred by 
landowners wanting the smallest coefficient of variation of return (Table 5). 
  The results suggest that risk attitudes do not have much effect on the tenant’s preferred 
leasing alternative.  Tenants prefer cash leases for coefficients of relative risk aversion from 0 to 3 
(Table 6).  As tenants become more risk averse, crop share leases are preferred (Table 6).  Risk 
attitudes also has little effect on landowner’s lease preference, as share leases have the largest 
certainty equivalent for every crop except wheat (Table 6).  The price-yield flexible lease is 
preferred by landowners renting land for wheat production (Table 6). 
Summary and Conclusions 
  This preliminary study of flexible leasing arrangements suggest that producers wanting to 
share price and yield risk should consider share leases.  However, a share other than 50-50 should 
be considered, as the cash equivalent of this lease can be significantly greater than a cash lease.  
This may not be practical due to absentee landowners, landowners do not have the production or 
marketing skills to adopt a share lease, or the landowner’s desire to keep the lease simple. 
  Future research will consider a larger cash rent, especially for cotton and peanut production.  
The state average rental rate understates the economic return to land for these high value 
commodities.  Future research will consider the risk reducing benefits of crop insurance in reducing 
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics of Yields, Futures Market Prices, and Marketing-Year Average Prices  













b (bushels per acre)  74  22  108  40  0.30 
Soybean Yield 
b (bushels per acre)  22  3  27  15  0.16 
Wheat Yield 
b (bushels per acre)  41  7  50  31  0.17 
Cotton Yield 
b (pounds  per  acre)  610  156 846 314  0.26 
Peanut Yield 
b (pounds per acre)
  2604 404  3100  1750  0.16 
December Corn Futures Price 
c  $2.44  $0.40 $3.20 $1.93  0.16 
November Soybean Futures Price 
d  $5.77  $0.93 $7.27 $4.39  0.16 
July Wheat Futures Price 
e  $3.20  $0.71 $4.97 $2.51  0.22 
December Cotton Futures Price 
f $0.61  $.15  $0.85  $0.31 0.24 
Corn Marketing-Year Price 
g    $2.29  $0.41 $3.24 $1.82  0.18 
Soybean Marketing Year Price 
g  $5.63  $0.94 $7.35 $4.38  0.17 
Wheat Marketing Year Price 
g  $3.17  $0.67 $4.41 $2.29  0.21 
Cotton Marketing Year Price 
g  $0.57  $0.13 $0.75 $0.30  0.23 
Peanut Price 
h  $0.20  $0.04 $0.31 $0.17  0.19 
a. The C.V. is the coefficient of variation which is the standard deviation divided by the average. 
b. South Carolina State Average Yield from 1991-2002. 
c. Average closing price during September from 1991-2002. 
d. Average closing price during November from 1991-2002. 
e. Average closing price during June from 1991-2002. 
f. Average closing price during October from 1991-2002. 
g. U.S. Marketing year average price from 1991-2002 








Table 2.  Average and Standard Deviation of the Tenant’s Return to Unpaid Labor, Management 
and Fixed Machinery for Alternative Leasing Arrangements ($/Acre). 




















































































a. The average return is the top number while the standard deviation is in parentheses. 
b. Cash lease. 
c. A 50-50 crop share lease. 
d. Flexible lease adjusted by harvest-time price. 
e. Flexible lease adjusted by harvested yield. 









Table 3.  Average and Standard Deviation of the Landowner’s Return for Alternative Leasing 
Arrangements ($/Acre). 



















































































a. The average return is the top number while the standard deviation is in parentheses. 
b. Cash lease. 
c. A 50-50 crop share lease. 
d. Flexible lease adjusted by harvest-time price. 
e. Flexible lease adjusted by harvested yield. 
f. Flexible lease adjusted by harvest-time price and harvested yield. 
 
 







Table 4.  Tenant and Landowner Rankings of Alternative Leases Based on Mean Return. 
 Corn  Soybeans  Wheat  Cotton  Peanuts  Wheat-DC 
Soybeans 
  Tenant’s Rankings by Mean Return 
Cash 
a  1 
f  1 1 1 1 1 
Share 
b 5  5 4 5 5 5 
Price 
c  2  2 2 2 2 2 
Yield 
d  3  3 3 3 3 3 
Price-Yield 
e  4  4 5 4 4 4 
  Landowner’s Rankings by Mean Return 
Cash  5  5 5 5 5 5 
Share  1  1 2 1 1 1 
Price  4  4 4 4 4 4 
Yield  3  3 3 3 3 3 
Price-Yield  2  2 1 2 2 2 
a. Cash lease. 
b. A 50-50 crop share lease. 
c. Flexible lease adjusted by harvest-time price. 
d. Flexible lease adjusted by harvested yield. 
e. Flexible lease adjusted by harvest-time price and harvested yield. 








Table 5.  Tenant and Landowner Rankings of Alternative Leases by the Coefficient of Variation of 
Returns. 
 Corn  Soybeans  Wheat  Cotton  Peanuts  Wheat-DC 
Soybeans 
  Tenant’s Rankings by Coefficient of Variation of Returns 
Cash 
a  4 4  2 1 
f  2 4 
Share 
b 3  3 1 5 5 5 
Price 
c  5  2 3 3 4 2 
Yield 
d  2  5 4 2 1 3 
Price-Yield 
e  1  1 5 4 3 1 
  Landowner’s Rankings by Coefficient of Variation of Returns 
Cash  1  1 1 1 1 1 
Share  5  5 5 5 5 5 
Price  2  3 3 2 3 3 
Yield    3  2 2 3 2 2 
Price-Yield  4  4 4 4 4 4 
a. Cash lease. 
b. A 50-50 crop share lease. 
c. Flexible lease adjusted by harvest-time price. 
d. Flexible lease adjusted by harvested yield. 
e. Flexible lease adjusted by harvest-time price and harvested yield. 








Table 6.  Tenant and Landowner Certainty Equivalent Maximizing Leasing Alternatives for 
Varying Risk Preferences. 
  Corn Soybeans  Wheat  Cotton Peanuts  Wheat-DC 
Soybeans 
CRRA 
a  Tenant’s Certainty Equivalent Maximizing Lease 
0 Cash 
b  Cash Cash Cash Cash Cash 
1  Cash Cash Cash Cash Cash Cash 
2  Cash Cash Share  Yield  Cash Cash 
3  Yield Cash  Share Yield Yield Cash 
4  Yield Cash  Share Share Yield Cash 
5  Yield Cash  Share Share Yield Cash 
CRRA Landowner’s  Certainty  Equivalent Maximizing Lease 
0  Share Share Price-Yield  Share Share Share 
1  Share Share Price-Yield  Share Share Share 
2  Share Share Price-Yield  Share Share Share 
3  Share Share Price-Yield  Share Share Share 
4  Share Share Price-Yield  Share Share Share 
5 Share  Share  Price-Yield  Price-Yield Share  Share 
a. Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion where a zero represents risk neutral behavior while a five 
represents extremely risk averse behavior. 
b. Leasing alternative that maximizes the certainty equivalent for the Coefficient of Relative Risk 
Aversion.  Cash represents a cash lease, share is a crop-share lease, price is a flexible lease 
adjusted by harvest price, yield is a flexible lease adjusted by harvested yield, and price-yield is a 
flexible lease adjusted by harvest price and yield. 
 